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THE EVOLUTION OF FORSEEABILITY IN THE 




Daniel J. Herron* 
Laura Powell** 





“Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.”1 
 
In the long, rich, dense, and circuitous history of the 
common law, no cause of action is so fraught with legal 
intrigue and controversy as tort law.  Within tort law, no case 
has generated so much of that legal and intellectual intrigue as 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.2  As every first year law 
student learns, Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority, and 
Judge Andrews, writing for the dissent, have a classic battle of 
the titans in arguing whether foreseeability is intertwined in the 
legally-determined duty or whether it is a component of the 
factually-decided proximate cause.  Palsgraf creates a number 
of legal questions which reflect back on, and determine the 
future of common law torts. Let’s begin with the classic 
overview of Palsgraf. 
 
PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD3 
 
Two employees of the defendant, the Long Island 
Railroad, were helping a late-arriving passenger onto his train 
___________________________________________________
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when their actions caused the passenger to drop a package 
containing fireworks.  The fireworks exploded and the shock  
wave caused a scale at the other end of the platform to fall, 
injuring Mrs. Helen Palsgraf.  Palsgraf sued successfully and 
prevailed on appeal as well.  The New York Court of Appeals, 
comparable to every other state’s Supreme Court, reversed by a 
4-3 decision, with Judge Cardozo writing for the majority and 
Judge Andrews writing for the dissent.4 
 
The gist of the decision was not whether foreseeability 
was a requirement in determining tort liability, but where that 
foreseeability was placed, so to speak. Cardozo argued that 
foreseeability is part and parcel of the determination of duty, 
and as such, is an issue of law. To that end, Cardozo opined 
that the foreseeability requirement was not met, as a matter of 
law.5 Andrews argued that foreseeability is part and parcel of 
causality, specifically proximate cause, and subject to a jury’s 
finding.6  As such, he argued that the trial jury found for 
Palsgraf, affirmed on appeal, and thus the judgment should be 
affirmed by the state’s highest court. 
 
These arguments beg the questions of when, how and 
why did foreseeability make an appearance in tort theory. 
 
STRICT LIABILITY OR NEGLIGENCE 
 
The source of the common law of torts comes from the 
ancient English legal theory of the writ of trespass.7 It is argued 
that this writ may have evolved from the appeal of a felony 
since trespass required an action be alleged to have occurred 
“with force and arms” (vi et armis).  The writ also provided for 
a jury trial and money damages.8 Rather than an innovative 
development by the royal courts, it is thought that royal courts, 
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in recognizing this writ, were merely reflecting what local 
courts had recognized traditionally.  By the fourteenth century, 
the requirement of “with force and arms” had disappeared with 
the recognition of the write of trespass on the case.9  It is 
interesting to note that this writ of trespass on the case would 
lead to the modern tort of negligence, common law of contract 
via the writ of assumpsit, property law via the writ of 
ejectment, and the modern theory of restitution.10 
 
Rather than travel through the winding, tortuous (pun-
intended) route of tort law’s evolution from the fourteenth 
century until now, let’s start with the notion that “[t]he English 
law of torts—like the law of contract—was quite 
underdeveloped in the eighteenth century.”11  Common law 
rules of evidence prohibited both the victim and the tortfeasor, 
as parties in interest, from testifying.  Such testimony was 
generally crucial to trial success.  Likewise, in what we would 
now call medical malpractice, the plaintiff had to survive in 
order to pursue an action, a questionable condition in light of 
the medical crudity of the times.12 
 
It seems that prior to the advent of negligence as the 
driving causation of tort, tort law reflected more of a strict 
liability approach, which could be schematically reflected as  
Action=>result=>injury.  Thus, the actor is liable for the 
resulting injury so long as the injury is causally related to the 
action committed.  It seems that the relationship between 
Action and Result is a strict liability one, i.e. Action-causes-
result (regardless of how and why).  The causality issue then is 
viewed as “result=>not-too-remote injury,” whatever “not-too-
remote” means.  “It is the general principle, that every person 
is liable for the consequences of his own acts; he is thus liable 
in damages for the proximate results of his own acts, but not 
for remote damages.”13 So, the “Action” is not required to be a 
negligent action, but any action. The strict liability here is in 
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the breach of duty, not the causality of injury.  As one 
commentator notes rather definitively: 
 
…prior to 1850 remedies for civil wrongs were 
governed by common law principles of strict 
liability…Fault was irrelevant in trespass actions and 
proximate cause as a concept was nonexistent.  
Defendants were strictly liable for trespass injuries. 
Indirect injuries, those that occurred as a consequence 
of the defendant’s actions but not because of direct 
physical contact, could be compensated for by using 
“trespass on the case.”14 
 
What caused the relatively rapid shift from strict-
liability to negligence in the late nineteenth century? The often-
cited Morton J. Horowitz argues that the fault theory of 
negligence was not established in American tort law until 
“nineteenth century judges sought ‘to create immunities from 
legal liability and thereby to provide substantial subsidies for 
those who undertook schemes of economic development.’ The 
modern notion of negligence, then, was incorporated into tort 
law by economically motivated judges for the benefit of 
businessmen and business enterprises.”15 Lawrence Friedman 
supports Horowitz’s contention in arguing that negligence-
based tort liability “has to be attributed to the industrial 
revolution—to the age of engines and machines [which] have a 
marvelous capacity to cripple and maim their servants.”16 
“According to Friedman, nineteenth-century judges believed 
that holding business strictly liable for all of the injuries they 
caused could have drained them of their economic blood. 
Consequently, these judges reduced tort liability to a standard 
of ordinary care ‘to limit damages to some modern measure’ so 
that capital could ‘be spared for its necessary work.’”17 
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However, Kaczorowski vehemently disagrees with 
Horowitz’s conclusion in his exhaustive review of historical 
tort law.18 His rationale, though, is a bit confusing. He argues 
that the shift to negligence-based tort liability and away from 
strict liability is a result of changing public policy of 
“economic interests of society generally, not the interests of 
particular classes,” apparently referring to “business” as a 
“particular class.”19  Kaczorowaki writes 
 
As societal conditions changed, the judicial application 
of these principles and policies changed accordingly to 
achieve the same public policies.  Judicial 
instrumentalism, understood as judges formulating, 
modifying, and changing rules to achieve desirable 
goals of public policy, was characteristic of the 
common-law system for centuries. It was not new or 
unique to the nineteenth century as some legal 
historians, such as Morton Horowitz, have argued.20 
 
He further claims that “modern tort law was not the 
creation of judges in nineteenth century America trying to 
protect business interests and to promote economic 
development.”21 Yet, in a paragraph before this conclusion and 
as referred to above, he notes “[j]udges also sought to promote 
economic activity as a social good. However, they used tort 
law to protect and promote the economic interests of society 
generally, not the interests of particular classes.”22  
Kaczorowski does an excellent job in identifying the use of 
negligence in tort liability prior to the nineteenth century.23 
However, an argument can be that the preponderance of using 
negligence in tort liability did not fully come into its own until 
the latter part of the nineteenth century.  Maybe the difference 
here is so nuanced that the differentiation is not clear. But there 
are two “clear” conclusions to be drawn from this debate: 
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1) The mid- to –late nineteenth century saw a clear shift in 
tort theory away from strict liability and towards 
negligence; and 
2) Whether intended or coincidental, the result of this shift 
clearly aided business and economic development. 
 
It seems that by fast-forwarding fifty to sixty years or so, 
history can determine that this development foreshadows the 
legal realism attack on classical formalism in formalistic 
contract areas, such as estoppel theories. If, as Morton claims, 
these judges were social engineers, so to speak, then they did 
indeed lay the foundation for legal realism’s practical result-
oriented views leading us to believe that the tort liability shift 
was indeed deliberate and designed for the economic result 
which actually manifested itself.  The timing is simply too 
coincidental to conclude otherwise.  Now, as to whether judges 
crafted the negligence theory out of new, whole cloth, as 
Morton may be implying, or whether it was the coming 
together of centuries of tort evolution at this specific time is a 
topic for a legal historian, which both of these scholars are, but 
for our purposes, it is essentially an interesting side note. 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF FORESEEABILITY 
 
It seems that “foreseeability” may have been in the law 
from very early times in tort evolution, but simply 
unrecognized as such. Even though Frances Bacon referred to 
something like “foreseeability” and even more specifically 
“proximate cause” in his early seventeenth century maxim in 
jure non remota causa, sed proxima specatatur,24  the maxim 
was not cited in any legal opinion until the mid-nineteenth 
century.25 As the previous section of this paper indicates, tort-
like damage theory was rooted in a strict liability foundation.
 As Pollock and Maitland identify during the reign of 
Henry I in the Leges Henrici “[d]amages which the modern 
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English lawyer would assuredly describe as ‘too remote’ were 
not too remote for the author of the Leges Henrici.”26 However, 
we begin to see cracks in the wall of strict liability in the late 
eighteenth century, a full hundred years prior to the clear rise 
of the articulation of foreseeability in tort theory.  These cracks 
begin to show in the often-cited case of Scott v. Shepherd,27 
known more famously as the “squib case.” 
 
The case involves a youth, Shepherd, who tossed a lit 
squib into a public market area.  A squib is a miniature 
explosive, much like a moderately powerful firecracker. It 
landed on the table of a gingerbread dealer who immediately 
tossed it away onto another merchant’s table.  That merchant 
quickly tossed it as well when it hit and exploded, injuring one 
Mr. Scott, who lost an eye as a result of the explosion.  Scott 
sued Shepherd in trespass.  The question before the court on 
Shepherd’s appeal raised a number of issues: 1) does the action 
sound in trespass or trespass on the case?; 2) are the 
consequences two remote for liability to vest in Shepherd?; 3) 
does the third party intervener rule provide a defense for 
Shepherd? 
 
A divided court affirmed the judgment for Scott over 
the dissent of none other than Judge Blackstone. Blackstone 
points out that trespass lies for immediate or direct damages 
while trespass on the case lies for any kind of consequential 
damages.  Thus, Blackstone states that the matter must be 
dismissed in that it sounds in trespass.  However, even more 
interesting is that Blackstone argues that if the case sounds in 
trespass on the case because the damages are both too remote 
and subject to the third party intervener defense with the two 
merchants who tossed the squib after Shephard’s original toss. 
 
However, the majority relies on “strict liability” in 
rejecting Blackstone’s rationale in a two-pronged argument: 1) 
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Shepherd is liable in a strict-liability argument in that “. . .he 
who does the first wrong is answerable for all the consequential 
damages. . .”28; 2) since the original act, the throwing of the 
squib into a public place, is an unlawful act, the miscreant is 
responsible for all results.29  This hardly raised the specter of 
foreseeability.  However, it is Blackstone’s dissent that creates 
the “first chink in the wall,” so to speak, but it is intermingles 
with a significant question regarding the form of the action. 
Does he rely on a concept of foreseeability or third party 
intervener or some hybrid of the two?  In his dissent he cites 
Suppose several persons are playing at foot-ball [sic], 
which is tossed by many, and at last breaks windows; 
trespass vi at armis will only against the man who 
struck it against the windows.30 
 
Is Blackstone saying here that the injury to the third 
party is too remote for an action to lie against the original 
assault?  If so, we have the presence of “foreseeability.”  Or, is 
he referring more to the form of the action: trespass versus 
trespass on the case?  He seems to rest his ultimate conclusion 
on the form of the action; however, his dicta clearly states that 
he believes that an action on the case would fail under a 
remoteness or third party intervener analysis. Blackstone’s 
opinion does seem to follow contemporary English legal 
precedent that 
 
 “A line of distinction” between trespass and case settled 
in Reynolds v. Clarke 
[T]hat, where the immediate act itself occasions a 
prejudice, or is an injury…the proper remedy is by 
action of trespass vi et armis; but, where the act itself is 
not an injury, but a consequence from that act is 
prejudicial to the plaintiff’s person, etc his remedy is by 
an action on the case.31 
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Perhaps the question of when forseeability arose lies in 
the distinction between trespass/trespass on the case and the 
rise of negligence.  Strict liability, and conversely the lack of a 
foreseeability requirement, did not require the proof of 
foreseeability as a necessary element to prevail on a trespass or 




In American tort law, clearly Palsgraf was a game 
changer. Courts rushed to establish formulas and standards to 
use to insure that there was no longer unlimited liability for any 
of the potentially accused. Many of the cases that established 
modern tort law involve the shipping and transportation 
industries, which were the most lucrative and potentially 
dangerous in the early twentieth century. Competing legal 
theories soon emerged as courts continually cited foreseeability 
as the reasoning for their decisions but lacked any existing 
theory to justify their decisions.  
 
Noted legal theorist Leon Green wrote The Rationale of 
Proximate Cause in 1927 which established that any tort has 
six requisite elements: "(1) An interest protected, (2) against 
the particular hazard encountered, (3) by some rule of law, (4) 
which the defendant's conduct violated, (5) thereby causing, (6) 
damages to the plaintiff."33  Patrick J. Kelley, a professor of 
law at Southern Illinois University, postulated in 1991 that 
Green led a group of hard-line legal realists that believed that 
the courts’ reliance on proximate cause limitations for liability 
in decisions was really a cover for legislative policies of the 
time that were not as easily citable or understandable.34 
 
When looking at modern tort law, it is most important 
to examine the period just after Palsgraf, when strong jurists 
like Justice Cardozo and Learned Hand appeared to want to 
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establish clear and consistent rules for tort law so that there 
would be no confusion as to duties of care nor unlimited 
potential liability for the accused. While public opinion may 
not have always been on the same page (see Liebeck sixty 
years later), Twentieth Century tort law took great strides in 
limiting accused’s potential liability while also factoring in 
plaintiff’s possible contributory negligence (and to an extent 
establishing their own care of duty). 
 
EARLY DAYS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE LITIGATION 
POST-PALSGRAF 
 
In McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls35, only a year 
after Palsgraf, Justice Cardozo took a swing at the nuisance 
area of tort law, making sure to factor in contributory 
negligence into any liability equation. In this case, a woman 
tripped over cement that had extended onto a driveway after 
the City of Niagara Falls had ineptly installed a sidewalk three 
years prior. After catching her heel, the woman sued the City 
for damages, stating that their negligent cement pouring had 
created a nuisance in her driveway which had caused her to 
trip. 
 
However, Justice Cardozo established here that 
"whenever a nuisance has its origin in negligence," negligence 
must be proven and a plaintiff "may not avert the consequences 
of his [or her] own contributory negligence by affixing to the 
negligence of the wrongdoer the label of a nuisance."36 
Basically, Cardozo found that the woman was partly to blame 
and could not just cite the city’s “nuisance” as a factor in any 
perceived damages from her tripping. 
 
“Like many of Cardozo’s innovate decisions, 
McFarlane was a decision restricting potential liability. 
It was also a decision that preserved uniformity and 
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predictability in tort law even though it apparently 
changed some rules … The more often litigants in a tort 
case could anticipate the set of rules that would be 
governing their conduct, the more skillfully might they 
plan their affairs.”37 
 
In United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,38 written by the 
great jurist Learned Hand, this case established “the calculus of 
negligence” or “Hand test.” In this case, the United States had 
been leasing the barge Anna C, which was loaded with flour 
owned by the United States and moored to Pier 52 in New 
York Harbor. When the towing tug Carroll was sent out to 
move another barge, it accidentally severed the mooring line 
for all barges connected to Pier 52 and Anna C, now free, 
ended up sinking, causing the United States to sue the Carroll 
Towing Company in an indemnity action.  
 
The crux of this case is an algebraic formula whereby if 
B ≥ L x P then the accused may have met the standard of care, 
with B being the burden on the accused, L the possible cost of 
injury and P the foreseeable probability. If B < L x P, then the 
accused will not have met the standard of care required to have 
them free from liability. Often abbreviated BPL, this test is also 
referred to as     C > GL (where Cost is greater than Gravity of 
Loss). It is important to note as well that this test first occurred 
in case law in 1932 in The T.J. Hooper39, another tugboat case.  
In this case, it was found that the Carroll Towing Company 
failed the Calculus of Negligence test since the Court ruled that 
leaving a barge unattended during daylight hours posed such a 
significant risk that it would be fair to require the towing 
company to have a crew member to be aboard the ship. 
 
SHIFT TOWARDS PROTECTING DEFENDANTS AND 
ADDING DUTY OF CARE TO PLAINTIFFS 
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In Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room40, much like the 
McDonald’s coffee case41, this important decision (at least in 
New England) involved a woman being hurt by a restaurant’s 
offering that many in the public would likely scoff at. While 
eating her fish chowder (the restaurant was out of the clam 
chowder she initially tried to order) at a Boston restaurant, Ms. 
Webster soon found herself unable to swallow after a fishbone 
became lodged in her throat. Like the plaintiff in the 
McDonald’s coffee case, which on its face seems like a trivial 
injury, “this misadventure led to two esophagoscopies at the 
Massachusetts General Hospital, in the second of which, on 
April 27, 1959, a fish bone was found and removed. The 
sequence of events produced injury to the plaintiff which was 
not insubstantial.”42 
 
Noting that the plaintiff had been born and raised in 
New England (“a fact of some consequence” according to the 
court)43, the Defendant asserted that “here was a native New 
Englander eating fish chowder in a 'quaint' Boston dining place 
where she had been before; that '[f]ish chowder, as it is served 
and enjoyed by New Englanders, is a hearty dish, originally 
designed to satisfy the appetites of our seamen and fishermen'; 
that '[t]his court knows well that we are not talking of some 
insipid broth as is customarily served to convalescents.' We are 
asked to rule in such fashion that no chef is forced 'to reduce 
the pieces of fish in the chowder to miniscule size in an effort 
to ascertain if they contained any pieces of bone.' 'In so ruling,' 
we are told (in the defendant's brief), 'the court will not only 
uphold its reputation for legal knowledge and acumen, but will, 
as loyal sons of Massachusetts, save our world-renowned fish 
chowder from degenerating into an insipid broth containing the 
mere essence of its former stature as a culinary masterpiece.'”44 
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While the initial auditor as well as the judge and jury in 
the Massachusetts Superior Court (the trial level in the 
Massachusetts court system) originally sided with the plaintiff, 
ultimately the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sided 
with the Defendant’s arguments, after much discussion into the 
history of chowder and even a footnote including a recipe. The 
Court stated that “We are not inclined to tamper with age old 
recipes by any amendment reflecting the plaintiff's view of the 
effect of the Uniform Commercial Code upon them … Thus, 
while we sympathize with the plaintiff who has suffered a 
peculiarly New England injury, the order must be Exceptions 
sustained. Judgment for the defendant.”45  
 
This case, while apparently silly and amusingly written, 
is helpful to provide a look at the attitude of the era since the 
Court even goes so far as to cite a similar California case 
(since, in the Court’s opinion, “we know that the United States 
District Court of Southern California, situated as are we upon a 
coast, might be expected to share our views”46) as well as an 
Ohio case that was written by the future Chief Justice Taft 
(which the Court was “most impressed, however, by Allen v. 
Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167, where in Ohio, the 
Midwest …”47).   
 
Continuing Justice Cardozo’s fight (and eventually the 
legislatures’) against frivolous suits, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court ultimately ruled in favor of the 
Defendant due to an underlying sense that basically the 
plaintiff should have known what she was getting herself into. 
Going further than contributory negligence, the Court in this 
case decided not to punish a Defendant for a Plaintiff’s 
suffering an injury that could be seen as a natural and 
foreseeable by-product of eating fish chowder. It is not 
unreasonable for a fish bone to be found in fish chowder (now 
had she been able to order the clam chowder as originally 
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desired, this case would have probably had a different 
outcome). Regardless, the Court here limited Plaintiff’s ability 
not only to recover any damages but to sue in the first place 
because the plaintiff’s ordering of the fish chowder was the 
proximate cause of her suffering an injury due to a fishbone in 
her food. 
 
CONSUMER LIABILITY AND PROXIMATE CAUSE  
 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, 
proximate cause case law shifted from transportation and larger 
entities to the individual and consumer liability as the 
individual consumer became the greater focus. There is no 
greater example of this than the infamous “McDonald’s coffee” 
case, aka Liebeck v. McDonald’s.  
 
In Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants,48 while not an 
appellate decision that established any grand tort theory, this 
case is arguably one of the most famous of the last fifty years. 
Stella Liebeck, a then 79-year-old woman, was the passenger 
in her grandson’s 1989 Ford Probe, which lacked cup holders. 
After going through the McDonald’s drive-through and 
ordering a 49-cent cup of coffee, her grandson pulled over so 
that she could add cream and sugar to her coffee. As she placed 
the cup between her knees and pulled the lid off towards her, 
the coffee spilled on her cotton sweatpants, causing third-
degree burns on her thighs, groin and butt. As a result, the 
plaintiff had to be hospitalized for eight days and required 
multiple skin grafts. 
 
Testimony during trial included McDonald’s stating 
that they purposefully kept the coffee hot so that the coffee 
would remain hot during the commuters’ drive. However, 
McDonald’s own research showed that people often drank the 
coffee right away. By making the coffee as hot as it was served 
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(around 180 degrees Fahrenheit), the plaintiff’s attorneys 
argued that coffee drinkers could suffer third-degree burns in 
approximately twelve to fifteen seconds. Cooling the coffee 
another 20 degrees extended that time to twenty seconds. 
 
Applying the principles of comparative negligence, the 
jury found McDonald’s 80% liable and Liebeck 20% liable, 
awarding her $200,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7 
million in punitive damages (totaling two days’ worth of coffee 
sales for McDonald’s). While the case never made it to 
appellate court, settling for less than $600,000 before it was 
heard, this case became the stereotypical example in the media 
of a frivolous lawsuit and, much to the delight of huge 
corporations, helped to pave the way for many states to pass 
legislation capping potential tort case recovery.  
 
To this day, many Americans, when they hear this case, 
believe the plaintiff’s claims to be without merit and frivolous, 
with the extent of her injuries suffered often massively 
underestimated by the general populace. However, once this 
case is boiled down (no pun intended), it really is simply a 
proximate cause case, asking the jury to determine just how 
much McDonald’s should have been able to foresee and how 
much they should have been able to prevent in Liebeck’s 
injuries. While the idea of a customer being able to sue because 
she spilled coffee on herself may seem ridiculous on its face, 
this case ultimately made corporations more responsible and 
more fearful of publicity-damaging litigation, forcing them to 
reexamine their care of duty and their potential proximate 
cause liability while lobbying state and federal legislatures to 
limit any such punitive monetary liability. 
 
While the outcome of this case has ultimately been to 
coincide with the mid-century shift back towards the 
establishing of a care of duty towards the plaintiffs, this case 
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was interesting in that it showed that some of the early century 
trend towards establishing just how much of a care of duty 
existed for the accused still was prevalent in the public mind. 
This case also speaks to the difficulty of allowing juries to 
determine seminal tort law – absent an appellate decision on 
this case it is almost impossible to discern where courts would 
have come down on this verdict (though many similar cases 
were thrown out by trial courts prior to this one and most 
assuredly since). 
 
PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Our analysis of the modern tort theory of proximate 
cause would not be complete without a look at the Court 
system of the United Kingdom, if for no other purpose than as 
a comparison to the evolution of the theory in the United 
States. 
 
Before jumping into the modern field of proximate 
cause in the courts of the United Kingdom, a cursory look at 
the historic case law of foreseeability shows a similar 
development to that of the United States.  Beginning, very 
simply, with the earlier mentioned Scott v. Shepard49 also 
known as the Squib case, negligence is determined by a simple 
“but-for” causation analysis.  However, as we move into the 
next century another case enters the British legal system in 
1841 that displays aspects of what any American law student 
would recognize as proximate cause.  In Lynch v. Nurdin50 the 
Court held that a defendant who negligently left a horse cart 
unattended for a lengthy period of time in an area where 
children are known to play is liable for harm to the plaintiff (a 
child) who fell off the cart and was injured when another child 
started up the horse attached to the cart.  This decision 
introduced the foreseeability argument into the “but-for” 
causation analysis in the United Kingdom.  More than thirty 
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years later another case involving a horse and cart arose in 
Clark v. Chambers51 (1878) where the Court found that the 
defendant-landowner, who negligently blocked a carriageway 
with spiked stakes, is liable for harm caused to the plaintiff 
when an unknown third-party removed the stakes from the road 
and put them in the middle of an adjoining footpath causing 
injury to the plaintiff.  Again, foreseeability is used as a means 
of finding liability through a but-for analysis, and erasing the 
intervening cause defense. 
  
The historical analysis then jumps into the 20th century 
with a string of three cases that set the stage for modern 
causation in tort law in the United Kingdom.  Starting with In 
re Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., 
Ltd. (1921)52 which held defendant liable for damage “directly 
traceable to the negligent act” even if that damage is not “the 
exact kind of damage one would expect.”  Thus utilizing the 
foreseeability analysis laid out in the previous century and 
adding a limitation to said analysis in terms of causation and 
liability.  Eleven years later, a duty is established in Donague v. 
Stevenson (1932)53 which expounded the general principle that 
reasonable foreseeability of physical injury to another 
generates a duty of care.  This principle is then explained more 
thoroughly thirty years later in the Australian case Wagon 
Mound I (1961)54 which stated that the injury must be 
reasonably foreseeable otherwise it is “outside the scope of 
duty” or “too remote.”  The proposition being that reasonable 
foreseeability governs the question of whether the injury comes 
within the scope of duty. 
 
As this analysis indicates the United Kingdom does 
have a smattering of case law from the past two hundred years, 
some of which parallels the proximate cause case law of the 
United States.  However, the United Kingdom never had the 
seminal Palsgraf-type case that we all learn about in our Law 
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School 1L torts class. There is no assumption of proximate 
cause, and in fact, that term rarely to never comes up in the 
literature and cases. Foreseeability is the benchmark and 
standard by which all negligence cases are determined in the 
UK.  Per the case Bourhill v. Young’s Executor55 foreseeability 
is used four times to determine: 1) whether a duty exists; 2) 
whether an act or omission is a breach of duty; 3) whether 
reasonable care has been taken (in the guise of probability); 
and 4) for what damage the defender is liable.56  Below are 
four cases that illustrate and outline the current field of 
negligence analysis currently in play in the courts of the United 
Kingdom. 
 
In the facts of Jolly v. Sutton London Borough 
Council,57 a small boat and trailer that had been abandoned in 
1987 on a piece of open land owned by the Sutton Borough of 
London and adjacent to a block of apartments also owned by 
the Borough.  The open land where the boat was placed was a 
green space where children from the neighboring apartments 
often played.  In 1988 the Council placed a sticker on the boat 
stating “Danger do not touch this vehicle unless you are the 
owner” and also stated that the boat would be removed in 
seven days if not claimed by the owner.  The boat was never 
removed and in mid-1989 the Plaintiff, Justin Jolly, then 13 
years old, and a friend found the boat as they were walking 
past.  The following February the plaintiff and his friend 
returned to the boat with the intention of fixing it up in order to 
sail it.  During the course of their repairs, which took several 
months, the plaintiff and his friend turned the boat over and 
propped it up so it was supported by the trailer and a jack the 
plaintiff brought from home in order to crawl underneath to 
render repairs.  During one work session in April 1990, Justin 
was alone under the boat when it started rocking.  Before the 
plaintiff could crawl out from under the boat, it collapsed off 
the jack and trailer that were holding it up and fell onto the 
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plaintiff causing him to suffer a broken back resulting in 
paraplegia. 
 
The issue that arose before the House of Lords was 
whether the boat was a reasonably foreseeable trap or 
allurement to children such that it would cause them injury, 
and whether or not the defendants should have taken measures 
to protect the plaintiff from danger. 58 
 
At trial the court held that the accident and sustained 
injury to the plaintiff were reasonably foreseeable, therefore 
the defendants breached their duty to plaintiff as 
occupiers.59  The Appeals Court reversed and held that the 
immediate cause of the injury was the plaintiff’s decision to 
jack up the boat and work underneath it, essentially claiming 
his “work” was an intervening cause.  The Secondary Court 
then when on to determine that it was not reasonably 
foreseeable that the injury would occur in this way.60  The 
House of Lords ultimately agreed with the trial court and held 
that even though this particular injury may not have been 
foreseeable, it was foreseeable that the boat would cause 
injury, thus the defendant is liable.61 
 
The Trial Court reasoned that it was foreseeable that 
children would play in the area where the dilapidated boat was 
abandoned and thus could be attracted to the boat and thus 
harmed by it if they were to play on it.  This particular harm 
was foreseeable because children imitating adults, in this case 
working on the boat, is a form of play.62  The Court of Appeal 
however, held that working on the boat was not playing and 
therefore was not a foreseeable action.63   Upon appeal to the 
House of Lords it was determined that the trial court was the 
finder of fact and at trial it was determined that play can mimic 
adult behavior, thus what the plaintiff and is his friend were 
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doing was play.  “The Court of Appeal was not entitled to 
disturb the judge’s findings of fact.”64 
 
This case hinges on the basic legal and factual concept 
of foreseeability.  Although it was foreseeable that the 
abandoned and derelict boat could cause harm to children 
playing on or in it, the exact play that was used in this case was 
perhaps not foreseeable.  Nonetheless, the trial court 
determined that the plaintiff’s actions were play and that 
therefore the damage was foreseeable.  The House of Lords 
goes on to determine that the Court of Appeals was wrong to 
overrule the trial court’s finding of fact, and by viewing the 
injury as unforeseeable meaning the defendant as not 
liable.  The House of Lords ruled that prevailing case law 
determined that a foreseeable hazard even if an unforeseeable 
consequence results in liability.65 Lord Hoffman, concurring 
with the majority, states that the Council admits a duty in 
regards to the damages of the boat as evidenced by the 
“Danger” sign.  Therefore, to eliminate this risk would have 
been the same amount of effort as to eliminate the risk to the 
plaintiff.66  “[T]he judge’s broad description of the risk as 
being that children would ‘meddle with the boat at the risk of 
some physical injury’ was the correct one to adopt on  the facts 
of the case.  The actual injury fell within that description and I 
would therefore allow the appeal.”67  Because some injury was 
foreseeable to the child-residents a duty was owed to the 
plaintiff.  Defendant is liable because it breached this duty even 
though the exact injury which occurred was not entirely 
foreseeable. 
 
In the 2004 Scottish case of Simmons v. British Steel 
Plc.,68the plaintiff, Christopher Simmons, was employed by the 
defendant, British Steel, doing a job which involved holding a 
burning torch to strip off scrap metal.  The torch was fed with 
gas and oxygen through flexible tubes.  On the date in question 
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Simmons had climbed onto a table to complete his work, 
approximately 1.5 feet off the ground.  As he went to step 
down off the table he became entangled in the tubes attached to 
the torch and as a result fell off the table, hitting his head and 
splitting the visor on his headgear.  The plaintiff sustained an 
injury to his right ear and complained of a sore head and a 
headache.  A few weeks after the accident the plaintiff’s pre-
existing skin condition became exacerbated and the plaintiff 
developed signs of depression.  This was accompanied by the 
plaintiff’s inability to return to work and an ever increasing 
anger at the situation.  
 
“Some time after the accident the pursuer’s anger 
exacerbated his pre-existing psoriasis and, as a result, 
the defenders’ works medical officer refused to allow 
him to return to work. This, too, angered the 
pursuer.  His prolonged absence from work caused him 
to become preoccupied with the accident and more 
angry at the defenders, inter alia because the defenders’ 
personnel department failed to visit him or to take any 
interest in him.  All of this resulted in a deterioration in 
the pursuer’s mental state, leading to his depressive 
illness.”69 
 
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court was 
correct in finding that the defendant is liable for not only the 
immediate physical injuries of the accident (which it did not 
contend) but also that the defendant is liable for the emotional 
distress, depression, and exacerbated skin condition. 
 
The Trial Court found that the emotional damages and 
skin condition were not part of the defendant’s liability.70  The 
Second Division (appeal) found for the plaintiff and awarded 
him a sum of £498,221.77.71   
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The basic rule states that if physical injury to the 
defendant was foreseeable, then there is a duty of care 
established, and therefore the actual injury doesn’t 
matter.72  “[A]ll that matters is that the defenders were in 
breach of their duty of care not to expose the pursuer to the risk 
of personal injury and that, as a result of the breach, the pursuer 
suffered both physical and psychiatric injuries.”73  The duty 
was clearly established through the employer-employee 
relationship, but is further established by the fact that other 
stations, similar to the one at which plaintiff worked, had 
altered torches with retractable tubes to prevent accidents such 
as the one in question in this case.74 
 
The House of Lords found that “Regret, fear for future, 
frustration at the slow pace of recovery and anger are all 
emotions that are likely to arise, unbidden, in the minds of 
those who suffer injuries in an accident such as befell the 
pursuer.  If, alone or in combination with other factors, any of 
these emotions results in stress so intense that the victim 
develops a recognized mental illness, there is no reason in 
principle why he should not recover damages for that illness.”75  
Thus stating the rule that defendants are liable for both physical 
and psychological damage incurred as a result of the 
negligence, even if this extent of injuries were not 
foreseeable.76  This general rule and other rules from case law 
are then laid out, being often quoted and applied in subsequent 
cases.     
 
“[O]nce liability is established, any question of 
remoteness of damage is to be approached along the 
following lines which may, of course, be open to 
refinement and development.  (1) The starting point is 
that a defender is not liable for a consequence of a kind 
which is not reasonably foreseeable. . .(2)While a 
defender is not liable for damage that was not 
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reasonably foreseeable, it does not follow  that he is 
liable for all damage that was reasonably foreseeable: 
depending on the circumstances, the defender may not 
be liable for damage caused by a novus actus 
interveniens or unreasonable conduct on the part of the 
pursuer, even if it was reasonably foreseeable. . . (3) 
Subject to the qualification in (2), if the pursuer’s injury 
is of a kind that was foreseeable, the defender is liable, 
even if the damage is greater in extent than was 
foreseeable or it was caused in a way that could not 
have been foreseen. . .(4) The defender must take his 
victim as he finds him. . .(5) Subject again to the 
qualification in (2), where personal injury to the pursuer 
was reasonably foreseeable, the defender is liable for 
any personal injury, whether physical or psychiatric, 
which the pursuer suffers as a result of his 
wrongdoing.”77 
 
In the case of Corr (Administratix of the Estate of 
Thomas Corr (Deceased)) v. Ibc Vehicles Limited,78 Thomas 
Corr, now deceased, was employed by the defendant has a 
maintenance engineer.  On the day in question, Mr. Corr was 
working on a line producing prototype vehicles when a 
machine fitted with a high intensity sucker picked up a metal 
panel and moved it quickly and without warning at Mr. 
Corr.  Mr. Corr ducked, otherwise he would have been 
decapitated, however the metal did hit the right side of his head 
and severed most of his right ear.  As a result of this accident 
Mr. Corr had to endure reconstructive surgery, he was 
disfigured, and he suffered from unsteadiness, tinnitus, severe 
headaches, and had trouble sleeping.  Mr. Corr also suffered 
from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the 
accident.  Due to the accident and lingering physical and 
emotional effects it left on him, Mr. Corr developed depression 
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and became suicidal over the next six years until 2002 when he 
took his own life by jumping off a parking garage. 
 
The issue before the House of Lords was whether the 
plaintiff, the estate of Mr. Corr, can recover damages from the 
defendant for the financial loss attributable to Mr. Corr’s 
suicide?  Was Mr. Corr’s death caused by a wrongful act, 
namely the employer’s breach of duty?  Or is the suicide too 
remote from the accident to make the defendant liable?79 
 
The general rule states that “it is now accepted that 
there can be no recovery for damage which was not reasonably 
foreseeable”80  The foreseeability issue is tackled by 
determining that the depression was a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the breach of duty (the accident) and the 
suicide was a direct result of the depression.81  “Here, the 
inescapable fact is that depression, possibly severe, possibly 
very severe, was a foreseeable consequence of this breach.”82  
 
Causation is established by using a purely but-for chain 
of analysis.  “[B]ut for the employer’s negligence the accident 
at work would not have happened, that but for the accident at 
work and the physical damage he suffered Mr. Corr would not 
have become clinically depressed and that but for that 
psychiatric feature he would not have entertained suicidal 
thoughts or have attempted suicide.”83  When physical injuries 
are foreseeable and have been caused by the defendant, the 
defendant cannot then limit liability because the extent of those 
physical injuries were not foreseeable.84  This rule was then 
extended by a later case to include psychiatric injury.85 
 
The court in this case applies the five principles, or 
rules, laid out in Simmons86 and finds that although suicide 
may not have been a foreseeable consequence in terms of the 
extent of the injury (death), injury was foreseeable and there 
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was a duty which was breached.  Therefore, because some 
injury was foreseeable, and because that injury was a result of 
the accident the defendant is liable for the suicide.87 
 
The events of Robert Eric Spencer v. Wincanton 
holdings, Ltd.88 started when plaintiff was in a collision with a 
stationary tractor unit while serving as a serviceman in the 
Royal Air Force (RAF).  The collision injured his right knee, 
which remained so painful that he eventually had to terminate 
his employment and underwent an above-knee 
amputation.  Plaintiff adapted to his new physical situation, 
obtained a new job and bought a car which was in the process 
of being outfitted for use with a prosthetic leg.  Before the car 
could be altered for use with the prosthetic, however, plaintiff 
was out in the car when he pulled into the local gas station and 
without the assistance of his prosthetic leg or any sort of 
crutches filled his tank up by steadying himself against his 
car.  As the plaintiff returned to the driver’s side he tripped 
over a raised manhole cover and fell, causing him to rupture his 
left quadriceps tendon and confining him to a wheelchair. 
 
The issue before the House of Lords was whether or not 
the consequences of the second accident were caused by the 
negligence of the defendant, the party originally liable for the 
initial accident while plaintiff was in the RAF?  To answer this 
question the House of Lords uses the five rules set out in 
Simmons.89  
  
“English law uses the concept of causation to attribute 
responsibility for things that happen. . .In this context 
the English law of tort has developed what might be 
called ‘exclusionary rules.’  These are intended to assist 
judges in deciding the circumstances in which a 
defendant, whose liability to a claimant for a particular 
occurrence has been established, will not be responsible 
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for certain consequences of an act of negligence and the 
damages that are claimed to flow from those 
consequences.  Such consequences and the damages 
resulting are said to be ‘too remote’ in law to be 
recoverable.”90 
 
The court then goes on to discuss, what American law 
would call proximate cause by stating that “[f]airness, baldly 
stated, might be thought to take things little further than 
reasonableness.  But what it does is acknowledge that a 
succession of consequences which in fact and in logic is 
infinite will be halted by the law when it becomes unfair to let 
it continue.  In relation to tortious liability for personal injury, 
this point is reached when (though not only when) the claimant 
suffers a further injury which, while it would not have 
happened without the initial injury, has been in substance 
brought about by the claimant and not the tortfeaser.”91 
 
Despite the discussion and recognition of the theory of 
proximate causation and the limitations it places on negligent 
causation the House of Lords ultimately holds that “[l]ike the 
amputation, the fall was, on the judge’s findings, an 
unexpected but real consequence of the original accident, albeit 
one to which Mr. Spencer’s own misjudgment 
contributed.”92  Utilizing the tried-and-true “but for” causation 
analysis the court holds that the gas station accident was a 
natural consequence of the original incident and would not 
have happened but for the original negligence. 
 
As this succession of these cases from the past 15 years 
shows, the courts of the United Kingdom are holding very 
closely to the but-for causation analysis.  Rather than limiting 
liability assigned to the defendant by cutting the chain of 
events, the courts in the UK are in fact expanding liability 
through factually based foreseeability analysis. What is also 
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clear through the broader analysis and discussion within the 
case law, is that there is the idea of a limitation on defendant 
liability, similar to that of the role of proximate cause in the 
United States, there just has not yet been the widespread 




In law school classrooms all across the country, first 
year students are struggling with the concept of proximate 
cause.  They aren’t alone.  “Attorneys and the courts fail to 
understand the task involved in deciding the question and are 
often confused by terms such as proximate cause and 
foreseeability.”93 The courts of our nation, as well as the courts 
of our fellow common law country the United Kingdom, 
continue to struggle with this nebulous legal concept.  Where 
does foreseeability attach?  Is it part of duty or causation?  
What if the plaintiff contributed to the action?  These questions 
are indicative of the struggle that lawyers, judges, legal 
scholars, and our society as a whole must grapple with when 
confronted with a system of common law, the evolution of 
legal concept.  What is clear from case law and analysis over 
the past century is that liability has shifted away from the 
defendant with the devaluing of the but-for analysis, and 
towards a more thoughtful, and limiting, analysis based in 
proximate cause.  While the evolution has been relatively quick 
to progress in the United States, perhaps due in part to the ever 
growing interests of big business, in the United Kingdom they 
are still working to figure out if a limitation on liability via a 
proximate cause analysis is appropriate.  Moving forward into 
the jurisprudence of the 21st century, the courts will need to 
determine more fully how to define and apply proximate cause 
in negligence tort cases.  Common law is only useful if we can 
rely on it for precedent, even if that precedent is evolving.   
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